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Abstract
Electronic and remote voting has become a large field of research and brought forth a multiplicity of
schemes, systems, cryptographic primitives as well as formal definitions and requirements for electronic
elections. In this survey we try to give a brief and precise overview and summary of the current situation.
I. Introduction
Electronic voting sees a lot of adoption re-
cently. Electronic voting systems are for ex-
ample used in national-wide elections in Esto-
nia [MM06], for country council elections in
Norway [SB12] and for canton wide votes in
Switzerland [GG09].
To compete with traditional paper ballots, elec-
tronic voting system must ensure that the
voter has the same or better privileges re-
garding anonymity, integrity of the vote and
many more. Electronic voting is not trivial
and can not be compared with for example
e-commerce, even if it may come to mind. E-
commerce has not found solutions for double
spending and other fraud techniques and just
recalculates fees and prices accordingly - this
is obviously not possible for e-voting. Because
of the unique situation and requirements that
electronic voting exists in it is quite hard to de-
velop an e-voting system that can be used in
real-world elections and inspires trust in the
voter. Our main contribution is the documen-
tation of the current state of e-voting research.
In the following section properties which
need to be fulfilled by modern and secure elec-
tronic voting systems are defined. In Section
3 possible attack vectors are discussed. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 give an overview over existing e-
voting schemes and systems. Open problems
in e-voting are discussed in section 5 and sec-
tion 6 gives a brief overview of related work.
II. Preliminaries
Electronic voting systems claim to be at least
as secure as traditional voting systems like pa-
per ballots. In fact paper ballots (or even spe-
cial voting machines) have many security is-
sues. For example may the people counting
the votes be corrupted and publish the wrong
number of votes for a party. With the correct
use of cryptography these issues can be elim-
inated, which is a great advantage for remote
electronic voting systems. Therefore remote
voting systems need to fulfill the following re-
quirements:
Availability A voting system must remain
available during the whole election and
must serve voters connecting from untrusted
clients.
Eligibility Only elective voters are allowed
to cast one valid vote. Therefore no double
votes are allowed.
Integrity The integrity of the vote must be
guaranteed.
Anonymity and Election Secrecy The con-
nection between the vote of a user and the user
herself must not be able without her help.
Fairness Ensures that no (partial) results are
published before the tallying has ended.
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Receipt Freeness To reduce coercion, the
user does not gain any information about her
vote. Therefore she cannot proof her vote to
anybody.
Correctness Election results must be
counted properly and published correctly.
Robustness The system should be able to tol-
erate faulty votes.
Universal Verifiability After the tallying
process, the results are published and can be
verified by everybody.
Voter Verifiable The voter herself must be
able to verify that her vote was counted prop-
erly.
Coercion Voting Systems must provide secu-
rity aspects to prevent a coercer being able to
force the voter to place a vote for a specific
party, candidate etc.
In theory a voting system must be built
coercion-resistant to guarantee that a voter can
place her vote as intended even in the pres-
ence of a coercer. This implies that even sold
or leaked credentials cannot be used to place
ballots.
A. Usability
Providing coercion-resistance and overall secu-
rity leads on nearly all voting schemes / sys-
tems to a worse usability experience for the
voter. Most of the cryptographic features need
an action by the user, for example applying
some audit codes to mark the correct vote or
maintain a public / private key pair over the
whole tallying process to authenticate at the
system, place the vote and verify it at the end
of the ballot.
Thus a voting system needs to be simple
enough for the normal voter and ensure the
requirements above.
III. Attack Vectors
There are a lot of different attack vectors
which should be considered during the design
of an e-voting system. We discuss some of the
possible attack vectors in this chapter.
A. Infected Voter Machines
One could easily think of malicious software
on the voter machines which changes/deletes
choices a voter makes during the voting pro-
cedure. Widespread existing viruses, Trojan
horses, etc. could easily be adapted to manip-
ulate popular elections carried out via home
computers or mobile devices. Lifting the
anonymity of the voter could also be one pos-
sible goal of the malicious software.
B. Active Network Attacks
For a real world electronic election the stan-
dard network attacks like DDoS, Man-in-the-
Middle, etc. have to be regarded. Since the
election probably uses some kind of server-
client architecture a single point of failure
could be abused by an attacker. A Man-in-the-
Middle could also try to lift the anonymity of
a voter if certain data is not encrypted.
C. Network Correlation Attacks
An attacker with ubiquitos Internet surveil-
lance capabilities could forgo active attacks in
favor of simply correlating the timing of com-
munication and changes in the voting results,
thereby lifting anonymity.
D. Authorities Manipulating Votes
There should be no possibility for any of the
authorities to manipulate already cast votes
without the voter or some auditor noticing it.
For example a corrupt authority could just not
save an incoming vote or delete already saved
votes. The authority could also try to change
already cast votes or use information about
which voters did not use the opportunity to
participate and vote in their stead.
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E. Double and Unauthorized Voting
An attacker could try to vote without being
authorized, which obviously should not be al-
lowed. An authorized voter could also try to
vote multiple times in a way where all votes
are counted. This should obviously be recog-
nized and not allowed.
F. Coercion
An adversary could use monetary or other mo-
tivation to persuade a voter into voting for a
candidate the coercer wants. An e-voting sys-
tem therefore has to be mindful not to give
any form of "voting receipt" to the voter. If the
voter can not proof she voted like the coercer
wanted to even if the voter wants to prove it,
the coercer can not be certain that her manip-
ulation will be successful and may henceforth
abstain from coercion. But this is not the only
form of coercion. E-voting systems have to ex-
pect that voting credentials are sold or leaked
to a coercer and used to vote in the voters
stead. This is very difficult to mitigate and
an open problem regarding coercion.
IV. Schemes
To date there are an astonishing number
of different schemes describing the underly-
ing cryptography of electronic voting systems.
Most of the schemes rely especially on some
cryptographic primitive. In the following sec-
tion we will categorize some of them by the
cryptographic primitives they mainly rely on.
A. Group Signatures
In a group signature every member of a group
can sign a message on behalf of a group she is
a member of. Usually if a member signs twice
her identity can be revealed through a process
called tracing-by-escrowing. Another approach
is tracing-by-linking where double signatures
can be traced without escrowing the identity
of the double signer.
[TW05] propose a short linkable group sig-
nature and its application to e-voting. Their
scheme uses the group signatures during the
tallying phase where linked signatures are
removed and every remaining signature is
checked for validity before tallying the vote.
This scheme however has the drawback to be
coerceable. The voter can simply give the co-
ercer her authentication key and group signa-
ture, which the coercer uses to vote in the vot-
ers stead. Overall the proposed scheme is only
sketched out and the main contribution is the
construction of the group signature.
Helbach et al. [HSSE08] extend an insecure
code voting approach with linkable group sig-
natures which uses tracing-by-escrowing. Sim-
ply put, code voting is a procedure where
for every combination of voter and candidate
a unique and random code is generated and
used to vote for said candidate. Helbach et al.
[HSSE08] argue that a code voting approach
can be coerced by simply acquiring the voters
code list. Their approach is to issue a linkable
group signature for every voter which must
be used to sign the voting code. The authori-
ties are split into groups with different rights
(e.g. one group which can issue the group sig-
natures and one which can check if two sig-
natures are linked by escrowing) to prohibit
anonymity lifting. We argue that this only pro-
hibits the types of coercion where the voter
is not aware of the coercion happening. If
the voter wants to sell her vote or is bullied
into doing so, she can simply give away the
code-list and her group-signature. Also if the
signature-issuing and the group-checking au-
thorities conspire anonymity could be possi-
bly lifted. Helbach et al. further stated that it
is questionable to achieve universal verifiabil-
ity with their system, because publishing the
submitted voting codes could give the coercer
information about the success of her coercion
attempts.
B. Cryptographic Shuffles
A cryptographic shuffle is intuitively under-
standable as the permutation of some ele-
ments in such a way that it is sufficiently ran-
dom but still verifiable. The verifiability is
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needed to proof the correctness of the shuffle.
Typically a set of n entities is responsible for
the shuffling and the shuffle is secure as long
as at least one of the entities is not corrupted.
[Nef01] construct efficient verifiable shuf-
fles of k DSA public keys and tuples. They
propose a multi-authority scenario where the
voter encodes her vote through one or more
ElGamal pairs and submits it to the authori-
ties. The authorities then shuffle the votes and
publish their proofs. Possibly other authorities
who have the power to decrypt the shuffled
votes then decrypt and tally them. Since the
shuffled votes are anonymized one could pro-
pose to publish the votes and the decryption
key to achieve universal verifiability. The voter
has no means to check the integrity of her vote
and coercion prevention is also not discussed.
C. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a type of encryp-
tion where operations on the encrypted text
are reflected in the plaintext. For example: let
a = encrypt(2), b = encrypt(3) now c = a⊙ b
could lead to decrypt(c) = 5. Which op-
erations on the ciphertext translate to which
on the plaintext is dependent upon the used
encryption-algorithm. Exponential ElGamal
and Paillier are two examples of popular ho-
momorphic encryption algorithms.
[KY04] propose the Vector Ballot e-Voting
Approach. Before the election m authorities
generate a public and private key for the elec-
tion according to a homomorphic encryption
algorithm. The private key is jointly con-
structed by the m authorities to achieve thresh-
old encryption. In threshold encryption a
threshold t exists such that at least t of the
m authorities are needed to decrypt a text
encrypted with the corresponding public key.
The public key of the election is made public.
Every voter constructs a vector consisting of
entries corresponding to her choice. Each en-
try of the vector is encrypted with the public
key of the election. Beside the choice for prede-
termined candidates the vector contains a flag
which indicates whether a write-in candidate
is chosen as well as the write-in candidate en-
try if one was chosen. The voter constructs a
zero knowledge proof to show that her vec-
tor is well-formed. Authorized voters then
transmit their vote to the authorities. The au-
thorities use heuristics to extract the write-ins
while preserving anonymity. The non write-in
votes get compressed according to the homo-
morphic encryption that is used. Then at least
t authorities simply decrypt the compressed
votes to determine the number of votes cast
for the predetermined candidates. The write-
in portion gets send through a mix-net consist-
ing of authorities and then opened separately
for tallying. All steps and the corresponding
zero knowledge proofs are published on the
bulletin board to guarantee universal verifia-
bility. This scheme has no special coercion pre-
vention mechanisms.
The coercion-resistant scheme by Spycher
et al. [SKHS12] is based on the Coercion Re-
sistant Scheme JCJ [JCJ05]. Similar to the vec-
tor ballot scheme [KY04] Spycher et al. use
ElGamal encryption, zero knowledge proofs
and mix-nets. The authorities consist of reg-
istrars and talliers. All communication is han-
dled trough a bulletin board. The registrars
construct real and fake credentials during the
pre-voting phase. During the voting phase
the voters can use her credentials to vote nor-
mally. If a coercer demands from a voter to
hand out her credentials, the voter can hand
out fake credentials, which will be accepted
by the bulletin board. During the tallying
phase the talliers remove all votes which have
invalid proofs of correctness of fake creden-
tials attached. Then the real votes are passed
trough a mix-net, decrypted and tallied.
D. Coercion Evidence
There are many schemes which claim to
achieve coercion-resistance or at least receipt-
freeness, but to our knowledge all of them
do so by requiring either a lot of resources
on the side of the voting officials or impend
the usability for the typical voter by requir-
ing her to perform tasks which are either too
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complicated or not realistic (e.g. providing un-
tappable channels). Grewal et al. [GRBR13]
argue similarly and define coercion-evidence.
Coercion-evidence is fulfilled if the two con-
ditions of coercion-evidence-test and coercer in-
dependence are met. No further requirements
like an untappable channel or fake credentials
are needed. The coercion-evidence-test condi-
tion is met if a tests exists which gets the pub-
lic bulletin board as input and outputs an up-
per bound on the percentage of coerced votes.
The coercer independence condition is met if
every honest voter follows the voting proto-
col normally. Grewal et al. also propose a
scheme they call Caveat Coercitor that imple-
ments coercion-evidence and is based on the
JCJ scheme [JCJ05]. In Caveat Coercitor mul-
tiple votes can be made and a heuristic, uti-
lizing multiple votes of the same voter who
chose different candidates, can determine co-
erced votes. The benefit of that approach is
that the coerced voter does not have to be
aware of the coercion. Even coercion due to
leaked credentials is successfully recognized
if the voter follows normal protocol for vot-
ing. The drawback is that enough voters who
want to manipulate the election can choose
not to follow the protocol and that way push
the upper bound on coerced votes to a per-
centage where the election is rendered invalid.
To solve this Grewal et al. propose to either
disincentive dishonest voting by making it an
offence or by replacing the coercion-evidence-
test with a probabilistic variant, but leave the
decision up to future work.
V. Systems
Some complete voting systems exist today and
were tested in several situations. Most of them
use different cryptographic primitives as de-
scribed below.
A. Public Key Encryption
Asymmetric key encryption uses two mathe-
matically related keys (a key pair) for encryp-
tion and decryption. One of those is kept pri-
vate (the private key) and the other one is made
public (public key). Those keys are typically cre-
ated with the RSA algorithm, which can gener-
ate keys of size 2048 Kb for best usage and suf-
ficient security. It is then possible to encrypt a
message with the public key, decrypted with
the private key and vice versa.
Most systems, using the Public Key Encryp-
tion, give the voter the choice on which com-
putational device she wants to place the ballot.
Because of the Strong RSA Assumption [Bon11]
the user can assume, the ballot is encrypted
properly and there is no need for a special vot-
ing machine. Thus the voter can choose on
which device she relies.
A.1 DC Digital Vote-by-Mail Service
The DC Digital Vote-by-Mail Service (DVBM)
[Ste10] is a voting system started in 2010 in
Washington, D.C. as a pilot project by the
Washington, D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics.
The main goal was to give the citizens, who
are overseas during the election the possibility
to vote over the web at the general election in
November 2010.
Architecture DVBM is an open-source web
application built with Ruby on Rails and is
hosted on a typical Apache web server run-
ning MySQL as a relational database. The
database stores encrypted ballots and all infor-
mation about the elective users (including if a
voter has already voted).
Ballot The voter authentificates with the sys-
tem using her voter ID and a 16 character hex-
adecimal PIN number she received via postal
mail. After the voter authenticated at the
web application, she can download a PDF file
where she can mark her vote. Then she must
upload the file back to the web server, which
encrypts it with the ballot’s public key. The en-
crypted ballots are then stored in the MySQL
database until the end of the election. On the
last election-day a non-networked computer
receives all ballots, decrypts them with the
ballot’s private key (which only this computer
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has) and tallies the votes.
Vulnerabilities During the public trial of
DVBM, a team from University of Michigan
found an exploit in a module used to upload
the PDF files to the server [WWIH12]. They
gained access to nearly the complete server
within 48 hours of the system going live. This
case study was the first to analyze the security
of a real election system.
Due to these vulnerabilities, the system was
not used for the real election.
(Dis-)Advantages The system is built fairly
simple and the applied cryptography is easy
to understand. A drawback is that it is all built
into one server rack and therefore a single
point of failure exists as the attackers pointed
out.
Furthermore concepts to prevent coercion do
not exist and it needs an untappable channel
for the authentication credentials.
A.2 Civitas
Civitas [CCM08] is a voting system, which pro-
vides coercion-resistance and is both univer-
sally and voter verifiable. It was developed by
Clarkson, Chong and Myers from the Depart-
ment of Computer Science, Cornell University.
The system uses Public Key Encryption to en-
crypt the votes and some real and fake creden-
tials for coercion-resistance. These credentials
are generated the same way as it was in JCJ
and described above.
Architecture This architecture is split into
several modules with distinct functions: The
supervisor sets up the election and publishes
the ballot’s public key. A registrar publishes
a list of all authorized voters with their iden-
tifier and public keys. Multiple registration
tellers authenticate the voters, give them their
private credentials and generate a public key
for a distributed encryption scheme. At the
end multiple tabulation tellers collectively
tally the election.
Ballot A voter must register at least partly in
person, publish her public key to the registrar
and must have a registration and a designa-
tion key. With these keys the voter can contact
the registration tellers to run a specific proto-
col to get her private credentials. These can
be used to place the encrypted vote and pri-
vate credential to one of the distributed ballot
boxes. The vote is replicated between the bal-
lot boxes to prevent loosing the vote.
For tallying, the ballot boxes send all votes
to the tabulation tellers, which decrypt the
votes with the voters public keys and counts
them. After evaluating a random number of
votes, the tabulation tellers perform a random
permutation, implemented with a mix-network
[Cha81] to guarantee anonymity.
(Dis-)Advantages Civitas achieves nearly all
requirements for a feasible voting system.
Though the implementation of coercion-
resistance is fairly complicated, because the
voter needs to create fake credentials, give
them to the coercer, create real credentials and
then vote with them. This lack of usability
could implicate that coerced voters will not
create new credentials and go through the vot-
ing process to have their votes counted.
The distributed multiple instances of some
modules Civitas consists of, make it difficult
to place fake votes or to drop votes. Even cor-
rupting some of these instances is not enough
to break this system, due to the distributed en-
cryption scheme.
B. Homomorphic Encryption
Web-based Open-Audit Voting
Helios [Adi08] is an open-source web-based
voting system built with modern web tech-
nologies. It does not provide any concepts
for coercion-resistance and was built for low-
coercion elections like ballots at a university.
Architecture Helios is implemented as a sin-
gle web server and provides a single-page web
application. In the back-end the administrator
can manually add users and notify them via
6
e-mail. In this mail the voter gets an automat-
ically created 10-character password, which
she can use to authenticate herself with the
server.
Ballot This step differs from the other sys-
tems. The voter gets her credentials via mail
including a link to the ballot and the ElGa-
mal public ballot key. Following the URL
leads directly to the options to vote for each
sub-election. After all votes are made, the
voter encrypts her choices with the public El-
Gamal key. Before submitting her vote, Helios
adds some randomness to the encrypted vote
and the voter has the possibility to review the
choice to ensure all votes are set properly. If
everything is fine, the voter can sign in with
her username and password, seal the ballot
and cast it to the server. If the audit option
was chosen, the user can see the randomness
added to the ballot and can see if the choices
are correct. With the random factor and the
choices, the voter herself can verify that every-
thing was correctly encrypted. After this step,
the ballot gets another randomness added to it
and can be reviewed by the voter or is sealed
and cast.
All votes are published on the server. For
tallying the votes are shuffled and decrypted.
Some proofs for correct shuffles are published
so that everybody can verify the result of the
ballot.
(Dis-)Advantages Helios is centralized and
provides no mechanism against coercion, but
is kept simple. Even reviewing the correct
encryption of Helios is very easy to under-
stand. Each step of the encryption is done in
JavaScript, so the user can even disconnect the
computer from the Internet after she down-
loaded all credentials for the ballot, do her
choices, encrypt the vote and reconnect to the
Internet to cast the ballot. Attacks, which need
Internet connectivity, are therefore useless.
C. Blind Signatures + Secret Sharing
Blind Signatures Assume Alice wants Bob
to sign her message, but she does not want
him to read this message. With blind signa-
tures Alice would encrypt her message m with
her private key as known from RSA but add
a random factor to this encryption and send
the result m˜ to Bob. He may have Alice’s pub-
lic key, but because of the random factor he is
not able to read this message. After Bob signs
the message sig(m˜) and sends it back to Alice,
she is able to remove the random factor and
has a signature for her message sig(m).
So Alice can get a valid signature for her mes-
sage from Bob, but he was not able to decrypt
her message.
Secret Sharing Secret sharing mechanisms
described in [Sha79, Bla99] can be used to di-
vide a secret into pieces and distribute it to n
different entities. To reconstruct the secret, t
of n entities need to cooperate.
In the context of electronic voting this thresh-
old scheme can ensure that at least t entities
must be corrupted to gain access to the secret,
e.g. the secret key of the ballot to decrypt the
votes.
Secure Anonymous E-Voting System based
on Discrete Logarithm Problem
This web based voting system relies on blind
signatures and shared secrets [CCJC14]. It
provides anonymity through a net of proxy
servers the voter needs to connect through to
place her ballot.
Architecture The architecture is split into
five modules: The Certificate Authority (CA)
where the user can get her personal certifi-
cate, an Authentication Center to authenticate
the user, some Public Proxy Servers to hide the
source IP of the voter, the Tally Center (TC)
which counts all votes and a Supervision Cen-
ter (SC) for supervising the tallying task.
TC and SC use secret sharing to distribute their
private keys for the tallying phase.
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Ballot The voter needs to retrieve a personal
certificate from the CA, which must be em-
bedded into her web browser to authenticate
at the Authentication Center and to retreive
a blind signature from this entity over the
voter’s pseudonym the voter can choose. Af-
ter the voter makes her voting decisions, her
choices are encrypted with the public keys
from the TC and the SC and send through the
proxy servers to TC and SC.
After the tallying phase, the TC and SC coop-
erate to get their private keys to decrypt the
ballots. Only with this cooperation it is possi-
ble to decrypt the ballots and count them cor-
rectly.
(Dis-)Advantages With this complex struc-
ture the system ensures integrity and
anonymity, but provides no concepts for co-
ercion. Secret sharing between TC and SC en-
sures integrity of the ballots, because t out of n
TCs and SCs need to be fraudulent to corrupt
the whole ballot. Most of the requirements are
fulfilled, but the whole system needs many en-
tities to work properly.
VI. Open Problems
Despite the extensive research going on in the
field of electronic and remote voting there are
still a few open problems to consider. In the
following sections we name problems that are
either not solved at all or just partially. The
problems are not ordered by any criteria.
A. Coercion-Resistance
There are a lot of e-voting schemes and
systems that tackle this particular problem
[GRBR13, SKHS12, BMQR07, JCJ05]. However
there are problems with every one of the ap-
proaches. Some of the approaches have unreal-
istic requirements and are not suited for large-
scale deployment usability-wise, because the
voter has to follow special protocols in case of
coercion, most times of cryptographic nature.
[GRBR13] mitigates this particular problem,
but can only detect and not prevent coercion.
Overall there exists a lack of coercion-studies
trying to analyze and measure the coercability
in deployed real-world electronic and remote
elections. One could think of a study where
one of the systems claiming to be coercion-free
is deployed in a mock election and where one
or more coercing elements try to successfully
manipulate the election.
B. Secure Platform Problem
The term of the secure platform problem was
introduced by [Riv01]. The secure platform
problem describes the dilemma that the voter
should be able to vote using a home computer
or other device owned by the voter but real-
istically can not, because it is easy to compro-
mise said devices. Most voting protocols as-
sume some sort of trusted device to perform
the voting on, but a lot of voter-owned devices
are either already infected with malicious soft-
ware (up to 11 % [Lab13]) or could easily be
infected, if someone wants to manipulate an
election. Malicious software could change the
voters choice, not send the vote, pretend to
have voted correctly but misbehave, record the
choice and lift the anonymity of the voter with
the recorded ballot. The list of possibilities is
limitless. Furthermore the platform the elec-
tion logic is running on (e.g. tallying-servers,
bulletin boards, etc.) could be compromised
as well. There is almost no research devoted
to design voting protocols that do not have a
secure voting platform as a prerequisite.
C. Usability and Comprehensibility
The typical voter does not understand cryp-
tography. She also uses her computer mostly
for accessing the web and has no deep under-
standing of computers and software. If this
typical voter now gets confronted with elec-
tronic voting software that has a lot of options
and is not designed with usability as a primi-
tive in mind the voter is most likely confused,
overwhelmed and might even give up on try-
ing to vote electronically. Some systems al-
ready try to accomplish usability by running
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as a clearly structured step-by-step web ap-
plication for example the Helios Voting Sys-
tem [Adi08]. But even if the application has
good usability, a lot of voters do not under-
stand and therefore do not trust the system.
In the Norway electronic voting pilot [SB12]
personalized return codes were used to send
the voter a SMS confirmation of her vote. This
was well understood by the voters and height-
ened the trust in the system, although from a
security standpoint the return codes did not
contribute additional security. From this we
argue that usability and comprehensibility are
quite important properties for a large scale vot-
ing system, that are often overlooked by the
researchers designing voting systems.
D. Threat and Security Analysis
Typically voting schemes and systems are ana-
lyzed regarding theoretical threats that could
be possible because of weak cryptography or
flaws in the protocol design. But in real-world
systems there is also the component of the im-
plementation. A real-world election system is
a piece of software running on servers con-
nected to the Internet. As such they are po-
tentially vulnerable to network-based attacks
like DDoS, Man-in-the-Middle, packet sniff-
ing, compromised key attacks, etc. Another
point of concern are the software-components
used to implement the voting protocols. They
could contain back-doors or use vulnerable
libraries thus potentially opening the whole
system-network to attackers. As of now there
is very little work analyzing those threats in
regards to electronic voting. There are also
no widely accepted and open frameworks that
help implementing a secure electronic voting
system or network.
E. Distributed Systems
Currently election systems are implemented
using server-client architecture. As of default
server-client architectures provide some kind
of Single Point of Failure. There are systems like
Civitas [CCM08] which divide the authorities
into different parts (registrars, tellers, etc.), but
still expose a single point of failure. Imagine
for example the registrars failing - suddenly
nobody who is not already registered can reg-
ister for the election. We argue that completely
distributed and still secure electronic voting
systems are potentially possible and should be
explored.
F. Simple Distribution of Credentials
This is a somewhat abstract point, because ex-
isting systems obviously are capable of dis-
tributing the voting credentials to the voters.
But that typically happens over snail mail
which is often insecure in itself. Further possi-
bilities are credentials like the german ID card,
which contains an optional digital signature in
the embedded RFID chip.
VII. Related Work
Fouard et al. made an extensive comparison
between specific schemes for electronic voting
[FDL07] which currently seems to be rather
unfinished. Lipmaa et al. [Lip05] is an article
that gives an overview of different secure elec-
tronic voting protocols and J. Benaloh [Ben13]
published a study reviewing the state of coer-
cion with focus on electronic voting and new
technologies.
Our survey focuses on remote voting schemes
and systems and gives a short overview about
their cryptographic primitives.
VIII. Conclusion
In this survey we described current schemes
and systems for remote electronic voting and
gave an overview of possible attack-vectors
and open problems. We conclude that remote
electronic voting is still in need of a lot of re-
search and is not ready to be used in impor-
tant large scale elections like the presidential
elections due to missing complete secure sys-
tems. In a low-coercion environment like stu-
dent elections however remote electronic vot-
ing is already an option.
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